As the European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission review Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick, a number of academics, privacy advocates and Google competitors have argued that these competition/anti-trust authorities should consider “privacy” as part of their merger review. That’s just plain wrong, as a matter of competition law. It’s also the wrong forum to address privacy issues. If online advertising presents a “harm to consumers”, let’s try to figure out what exactly the harm is, figure out which online advertising practices to change, and then apply those principles to all the participants in the industry. But we shouldn’t bootstrap privacy concerns onto a merger review. That’s like evaluating a merger of automakers by looking at the gas mileage of their cars. We don’t invoke antitrust law to prevent a merger of car companies, because we think the industry should build cars that use less gas.
Some advocates state that online advertising “harms” consumers. So they reason that the merger of Google and DoubleClick would “harm” consumers more, to the extent that it enables more targeted advertising. But these same critics rarely cite specific examples of consumer “harms”, and indeed, I’m having trouble identifying what they might be. The typical use of ad impression tracking now is to limit the number of times a user is exposed to a particular ad. That is, after you have seen an image of a blue car for 6 or 7 times, the ad server will switch to an image of a red car or to some other ad. This means that a user will see different ads, rather than re-seeing the same ad over and over again. As someone who is sick of seeing the same ads over and over again on television, I think that’s good for both viewers and advertisers. There are also new forms of advertising that are enabled by the Internet that may allow for more effective matching between buyers and sellers. Again, I prefer to see relevant ads, if possible. I go to travel sites a lot, and I’m happy to see travel ads, even when I’m not on a travel site. I don’t want to see ads for children’s toys, and I dislike the primitive nature of television, when it shows me such blatantly irrelevant ads.
We all dislike unsolicited direct marketing by phone. So, we created a regulatory “do not call” solution. But without knowing which precise practices of online advertising create a “harm”, it’s impossible to discuss a potential solution. Moreover, a website that offers its services or content for free to consumers (e.g., a news site), tries to generate revenue from advertising to pay its journalists’ salaries and other costs. Shouldn’t such websites also have a say in whether they should be forced to offer their free content to consumers without the ability to match ads to viewers according to some basic criteria? It’s very clear (but worth reiterating) that free sites are almost always more respectful of privacy than paying sites, because of the simple fact that paying sites must collect their users’ real identities and real credit card numbers, while free sites can often be used anonymously.
Now, some legal observations relating to European laws on merger reviews. The overriding principle protected by those laws is consumer welfare: referring to those aspects of a transaction that affect the supply and demand for goods/services (i.e., that affect quantity, quality, innovation choice, etc.). The reference in Article 2(1)(b) ECMR to "the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition" must therefore be read in this context – consumer interests are relevant to the merger assessment only for the purpose of assessing whether the degree of competition that will remain post-transaction will be sufficient to guarantee consumer welfare.
The fact that non-competition issues, such as privacy, fall outside the scope of ECMR is consistent with the general consensus that merger control should focus on the objective of ensuring that consumer welfare is not harmed as a result of a significant impediment to effective competition. Introducing non-competition related considerations into a merger analysis (e.g., environmental protection or privacy) would lead to a potentially arbitrary act of balancing competition against potentially diverging interests. Accordingly, policy issues, such as privacy, are not suitably addressed in a merger control procedure, but should be dealt with separately.
Indeed, privacy interests are addressed in Directive 95/468 and Directive2002/589 (both of which are based on Article 14 EC and Article 95 EC), Article 6 TEU and Article 8 ECHR, and Google must abide by its legal obligations under these instruments. Such instruments are also far more efficient in addressing privacy issues than the ECMR, as they are industry-wide in scope. Internet privacy issues are relevant to the entire industry as they are inextricably linked to the very nature of the technology used by every participant on the Internet. Information is generated in relation to virtually every event that occurs on the Internet, although the nature of the data, the circumstances in which it is collected, the entities from whom and by whom it is collected, and the uses to which it is put, vary considerably. This situation pre-dates Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick and is not in any way specific to it. More importantly, any modification of the status quo in terms of the current levels of privacy protection must involve the industry as a whole, taking account of the diversity of participants and their specific circumstances.
Privacy is an important issue in the world of online ads. But it is not an issue for a competition law review.