Wednesday, January 6, 2010
DC: discussing privacy in public
Friday, December 4, 2009
On the sidewalk in Milan
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Remembering and Forgetting in Berlin

I've spent a few days in Berlin, and I've spoken with many interesting politicians and journalists about privacy. The most interesting case must surely be this one:
Two German Killers Demanding Anonymity Sue Wikipedia’s Parent
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/us/13wiki.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=german%20wikipedia%20murder&st=cse
In some countries in Europe, like Germany and France, there are well-established principles about the "right to be forgotten", an awkward translation of the "Droit a l'Oubli." As a privacy-sensitive guy, I'm all for the idea that people ought to be able to walk away from some awkward facts at some point in their lives. But I have never heard anyone be able to tell me how the "right to be forgotten" does not quickly cross the line into censorship. If two German murderers can require German publishers to remove references to their names in articles after they have served their sentence, isn't that censorship? And wouldn't it be even worse if they tried to re-write news archives, which are now rapidly becoming instantly findable online? And in the real world what will be the consequences if German Wikipedia deletes content that English Wikipedia still publishes?
And while I was in Berlin, I visited the Holocaust memorial, as I always do when in Berlin, and I wondered about the "right to be forgotten" in the midst of the memorial to "never forget".
Friday, November 27, 2009
Madrid and Berlin, trying to find workable approaches
Here’s an interesting article about the day-to-day challenges and contradictions of national laws in the context of the global Internet (ok, it does use some of us Google guys as unhappy examples, but just to make a valid point):
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aAv2iLcBnqtI
http://www.expansion.com/2009/11/12/juridico/entrevistas/1258051264.html
I’m off to Berlin now. Germany is one of those places where I feel the need to listen more than talk. I'll blog about what I learn afterwards.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Thanksgiving
Like most Americans, I woke this morning to one of my favorite days of the year, Thanksgiving. Unlike most Americans, I also woke this morning to news reports of an Italian prosecutor calling for me to be sentenced to one year in prison.
But in the spirit of the day, now that I’ve skimmed the news and reassured friends that I’m not going to prison (I hope), I’ll go about my day:
I’ll do some planning for my Dad’s 80th Birthday Party, do a kick-boxing class at gym, work on an academic privacy paper on the hotly-debated question of whether IP addresses should be considered “personal data” under EU law, give legal advice on some privacy questions, prepare for some meetings in Berlin, and, best of all, I’ll end the day with a candle-light dinner with the person I love in the city I love.
That’s a lot to be thankful for (well, not the Berlin or the Milan parts), but the rest anyway.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
European law on hosting platforms
How does the E-Commerce prescription work in real life? Say an Internet user uploads a video filled with illegal hate speech, nudity, or violence. When notified of this illegal content, the hosting platform is obliged to take it down. The hosting platform, however, is not obliged to monitor and prevent the upload. The responsible party is the Internet user who posts the content. In this case, Google did exactly what the law requires - it removed the content upon notification, and took the further step of complying with law enforcement requests, helping to bring the wrongdoers to justice.
If Google and companies like it were responsible for every piece of content on the web, the Internet as we know it today – and all of the economic and social benefits it provides – would disappear. Without appropriate protections, no company would be immune: any potentially defamatory text, inappropriate image, bullying message or violent video would have the power to shut down the platform that had unknowingly hosted it. In the offline world, it would be like criminally prosecuting post office employees because someone mailed an inappropriate letter. European law recognizes the importance of providing limitations on the liability of hosting platforms.
The Directive applies horizontally across all areas of law which touch on the provision of information society services, regardless of whether it is a matter of public, private, or criminal law. This is confirmed in the first Report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC dated 8 June 2000. See p. 4: "The Directive applies horizontally across all areas of law which touch on the provision of information society services, regardless of whether it is a matter of public, private, or criminal law. Furthermore, it applies equally both to business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce." And see p. 12: "The limitations on liability provided for by the Directive are established in a horizontal manner, meaning that they cover liability, both civil and criminal, for all types of illegal activities initiated by third parties."
From a public policy perspective, it wouldn't make any sense if it didn't apply to criminal charges. The objective of the directive was to foster a competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the EU. To provide an environment in which its citizens would have access to inexpensive, world-class communications infrastructure and a wide range of services. To create conditions for e-commerce and the internet to flourish. To enhance quality of life, to stimulate innovation and job creation, and to contribute to the free flow of information and freedom of expression. Those are words directly from the Commission. It wouldn't make any sense to apply these protections only to civil matters; doing so would permit criminal claims to eviscerate the very benefits the directive sought to achieve.
Today in Milan
Today in Milan, the Milan Public Prosecutors’ Office will make their closing arguments why 4 Google employees including me should be held personally criminally liable for content created by four Italian high school students and uploaded to Google Video. I have no idea what the Prosecutors will say in court today, and my lawyers have told me not to set foot in Italy, so I wanted to provide some factual background on this case.
In terms of timeline, the Prosecutors present their case today, November 25. The Google employees' lawyers will present their defense on December 14 and a verdict should be issued on December 23.
The Judge hearing this case is Judge Magi, who recently convicted 23 Americans, mostly CIA agents, as reported by the New York Times:
In a landmark ruling, an Italian judge on Wednesday convicted a base chief for the Central Intelligence Agency and 22 other Americans, almost all C.I.A. operatives, of kidnapping a Muslim cleric from the streets of Milan in 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/world/europe/05italy.html
Today’s trial stems from an incident in 2006 when teenagers at a school in Turin filmed and then uploaded a video to Google Video that showed them bullying a disabled schoolmate. Google removed the video promptly after being notified. Even so, last summer, the Public Prosecutor brought the following criminal charges against four Google employees, including myself. All of us face one or two charges:
Charge A: Criminal defamation against the Vivi Down Association, an association that represents individuals with down syndrome
Charge B: Failure to comply with the Italian Privacy Code
It should be obvious, but none of us Google employees had any involvement with the uploaded video. None of us produced, uploaded or reviewed it.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Ciao, Italia!
Monday, November 23, 2009
On Trial in Italy
Guys in Ties, thinking about children and privacy
Sunday, November 22, 2009
I've been taking a break
Thursday, April 16, 2009
The Cloud: policy consequences for privacy when data no longer has a clear location
Cloud Computing has become one of the more influential tech trends of our day. The Cloud is roughly analogous to remote computing, where computing and storage move away from your personal device to servers run by companies. A simple example might be online photo albums, which allow users to move their pictures off personal computers and into a secure and accessible space on the Web. Some Cloud services, like Hotmail, have been around for roughly a decade. And others have appeared since; almost all of Google's services, for example, run in the Cloud. As these services become more widely used, it's important to ask how our privacy laws and regimes should deal with this new phenomenon.
Some privacy laws, such as in the EU Directive, base regulation in part on the location of data. If data is in the Cloud, where exactly is that? Data in the Cloud exists within the physical infrastructure of the Internet, in other words, on the servers of the companies offering these services, as well as on users’ own machines. Cloud services are built on the concept that data held in the Cloud enables users to access and share data from anywhere, anytime and from any Internet-enabled device.
To know the “location” of data in the Cloud, you’d need to understand the architecture of data centers, among other things. Some companies like Google have data centers in multiple locations. A data center is a building that houses many, many, computers-- not too different from the ones you may have in your home. Companies try to pick places that, among other things, have a skilled workforce, reasonable local business regulation and are near low-cost and abundant sources of electricity. They tend not to provide too many specific details about these data centers, for a couple reasons. First, the data center industry is highly competitive and companies try not to disclose too many details that may give competitors a leg up. Second, knowing that users' personal information is stored in these computers, companies take the privacy and security of this data seriously and ensure that these buildings are well secured so that no one could just walk out with a computer holding your credit card information. The geographical location of data centers can be optimized to enhance the speed of a service, e.g., serving European users from a European data center might be faster than having the data cross the Atlantic. Finally, having data centers in different locations allows companies to optimize computing power, automatically shifting work from one location to another, depending on how busy the machines are.
Moreover, cloud applications are architected not to lose users’ data and to respond to queries quickly. Applications therefore usually replicate users’ data in more than one place. No Internet user would be happy if they lost access to all their email or calendar information, for example, just because the power goes out in some data center location. Applications may dynamically load balance their users among different data centers, so that the location of a particular user's data may change over time.
For all these reasons, it’s actually very hard to answer the apparently simple question: “where’s my data?” Indeed, it's becoming problematic that existing EU data protection laws were largely written in an era when data had an easily-identifiable location. For example, EU laws impose restrictions on the transfer of personal data outside the EU to any jurisdiction where there is not "adequate" data protection. In the past, "transfer" was defined as the physical shipment of data, such as sending a computer tape or paper files to an office in a faraway location. However, nowadays almost any activity on the Internet involves a transfer of data outside of the EU. Sending a document to a colleague in New York, for example, can technically be considered a transfer of material outside of the EU. In today's era of connectivity, strict and literal application of these laws would cause more than just a headache for companies and regulators: it would cause the Internet to shut down.
In this Internet age, when data flows around the planet at the click of a mouse, everyone agrees we need to identify a better model of privacy protections. Data doesn't start and stop at national borders when it travels on the Information Super-highway. From a privacy perspective, the important question is not “where is my data?”, but rather “who holds my data, and what are their privacy policies?" For a user, the important thing is to research and understand the data protection policies of the company which holds the data, regardless of its location.
I’ve looked at various laws around the world, and I’m impressed by the far-sighted model adopted in Canada’s privacy laws. I can’t do better than just quote the Office of the Privacy Commissioner:
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.asp
"European Union member states have passed laws prohibiting the transfer of personal information to another jurisdiction unless the European Commission has determined that the other jurisdiction offers "adequate" protection for personal information. In contrast to this state-to-state approach, Canada has, through PIPEDA, chosen an organization-to-organization approach that is not based on the concept of adequacy… [U]nder PIPEDA, organizations are held accountable for the protection of personal information transfers under each individual outsourcing arrangement…
Regardless of where the information is being processed - whether in Canada or in a foreign country - the organization must take all reasonable steps to protect it from unauthorized uses and disclosures while it is in the hands of the third party processor. The organization must be satisfied that the third party has policies and processes in place, including training for its staff and effective security measures, to ensure that the information in its care is properly safeguarded at all times. ... [O]rganizations must in their own best interests, as well as those of their customers, do what they can to protect the information."
Canada’s approach works to preserve privacy protections, and to hold data collectors accountable for privacy protections regardless of the location of data. Canada has blazed a trail that will help guide us in the age of the Cloud.
Friday, March 6, 2009
A picture of your house on the Internet for all to see
I did a little OpEd in the French paper Liberation on Google's Street View and privacy. Only fair, I guess, to put a picture of my own house on this blog. I confess, I did hesitate a minute before posting it. In any case, I do believe in taking one's own medicine, or eating one's own dogfood, as the case may be.
D’ici une centaine d’années, quelles avancées auront marqué notre époque ? Nos progrès politiques comme la création de l’Union européenne ? Les avancées scientifiques ?
Selon nous, s’il y a un progrès en gestation depuis la fin du XXe siècle qui pourrait marquer le passage de notre génération sur terre, c’est bien celui du partage de la connaissance. Engendrée par Internet, la démocratisation de l’accès à l’information au tournant du millénaire est une révolution dont on se souviendra probablement très longtemps. Dans une tribune parue le 13 février dans Libération, Odile Belinga et Etienne Tête ont émis un certain nombre de critiques concernant Street View, la nouvelle fonctionnalité de Google Maps qui permet de naviguer virtuellement dans les grandes villes françaises. Les deux auteurs affirment que ce service ne respecte pas la vie privée des individus et le comparent à de la vidéosurveillance.
Street View permet quotidiennement à des milliers d’utilisateurs de naviguer à trois cent soixante degrés grâce à des photos prises dans la rue à hauteur d’homme. Les internautes du monde entier peuvent ainsi se déplacer virtuellement, préparer leur prochain voyage à Rome, descendre les Ramblas à Barcelone, explorer leur ville, ou tout simplement repérer l’adresse de leur prochain appartement. C’est aussi un formidable outil pour mettre en valeur le patrimoine d’une ville ou promouvoir l’activité d’un commerçant. Il s’agit ici de contribuer à l’écosystème ouvert et bénéfique permis par Internet. Les nombreux partenaires qui ont choisi de s’associer à ce service (Télérama, Cityvox, l’Office du tourisme et des congrès de Paris…) ne s’y sont pas trompés.
Le service Street View respecte-t-il la vie privée ? La question est tout à fait légitime. Et la réponse est oui. Rappelons tout d’abord une évidence : sur Internet, l’information, comme la concurrence, est toute proche, à un seul clic de souris. Autrement dit, sans l’intérêt et la confiance de l’internaute, un site ne vaut pas grand-chose. Et cette confiance, il s’agit de ne pas la bafouer.
Les photographies affichées dans Street View sont parfaitement licites. Elles ne contiennent que des images de voies publiques et ne dévoilent aucune information qui n’était déjà exposée à la vue des passants. Les arguments selon lesquels un service de cartographie comme le nôtre ne pourrait pas utiliser de telles images au nom du respect de «l’intimité» remettent fondamentalement en cause la notion d’espace public. Ils dénaturent au contraire cette sphère de l’intime à qui la loi accorde, à juste titre, une protection accrue.
Les images de Street View sont les mêmes que celles que pourrait prendre n’importe quel passant dans la rue avec son appareil photo. Des images de ce type, sur les villes du monde entier, sont déjà diffusées dans toutes sortes de formats sur la Toile mondiale. Conscient que ce service rassemblait ces images en un seul endroit, Google a volontairement décidé de prendre des précautions supplémentaires en créant une technologie de floutage automatique des visages et des plaques d’immatriculation, dont la Cnil a d’ailleurs salué la mise en Å“uvre. Pour aller plus loin, en cas de visage non flouté ou imparfaitement flouté, toute personne peut demander la suppression des images concernées en cliquant sur un simple bouton. Les photos ne sont pas datées (ni heure, ni jour) et ne sont pas des prises de vue en temps réel. Bref, tout sauf des caméras de surveillance !
Soyons curieux, doutons, c’est ce qui a animé nos échanges avec la Cnil avant le lancement de Street View en France. Mais n’ayons pas peur, par principe, du progrès et des avancées technologiques qu’il implique. Prenons l’exemple récent de «Google Flu Trends» : avant d’appeler leurs médecins, beaucoup d’internautes utilisent comme mot-clé «symptômes de la grippe» dans leur moteur de recherche. Cette requête, multipliée par des millions d’individus a permis à Google de développer un outil de prévision des foyers de grippe capable de devancer jusqu’à dix jours celui des autorités sanitaires. En observant simplement les zones géographiques renseignées par les rapports de connexion. Soyons curieux, soyons vigilants, mais n’ayons pas peur d’Internet.
Bien plus que le véhicule de menaces, aussi réelles sur Internet que dans le monde physique, c’est avant tout un outil extraordinaire qui facilite nos vies au quotidien
Monday, February 9, 2009
Lead Data Protection Authority
Lead Data Protection Authority: how EU data protection regulation can catch up with other areas of European law
Being a global company means having employees, partners and users who interact on a worldwide basis without geographical or jurisdictional limitations. Maximising efficiency is a key driver so most global companies attempt to adopt a consistent way of doing business internationally. Whilst cultural differences may have an impact on some activities, economic globalisation encourages a uniform and coherent approach to most operations, from sales practices to compliance protocols. However, global companies still have to comply with diverse laws across jurisdictions and be accountable to many national regulators. All of these trends become even more pronounced for companies doing business over the Internet.
In the European Union, some industry sectors can benefit from regulatory regimes which are specifically aimed at simplifying the way in which players within those sectors comply with cross-jurisdictional rules. For example, pharmaceutical companies may rely on simplified procedures to have their products evaluated and authorised across the EU. One solution is called the “decentralised procedure”, by which companies can go directly to a national authority to obtain permission to market its products in that member state and then seek to have other member states accept the approval of the first member state. This procedure is applicable in cases where an authorisation for a pharmaceutical product does not yet exist in any member state.
Alternatively, pharmaceutical companies may in some instances rely on the mutual recognition procedure, by which the assessment and marketing authorisation of one member state should be mutually recognised by other concerned countries within the EU. Under the mutual recognition procedure, the pharmaceutical company submits its application to the chosen country, which will carry out the assessment work and approve or reject the application. The other countries then have 90 days to decide whether they approve or reject the decision made by the original country.
Similarly, financial services firms can seek authorisation in one member state and obtain “passport rights” to enable them to carry on financial services in other member states. When a financial services provider wishes to establish a branch or provide services in several EU countries, notification of such intention is submitted to the regulatory authority in the home member state. This notification is then forwarded to the regulator in the member states in which the operator intends to open the branch or provide its services. As a result, a particular product licensed in the home member state becomes automatically recognised in all other member states and may therefore be sold across borders free of undue bureaucratic controls.
Some areas of law – such as e-commerce – also follow the “country of origin” principle. This principle establishes that where an action or service is performed in one country but received in another, the applicable law is the law of the country where the action or service is performed. For example, if a company sells products online across
Data protection regulatory complexities
The jurisdictional rules under the EU data protection directive do not work like that. When a company handles personal information about employees, customers, suppliers and others, it will be subject to the different privacy and data protection regimes in force in each EU jurisdiction. In the European Union, data protection laws will establish a number of very specific requirements and compliance will be overseen by the data protection authorities of each member state. This means that the use of personal information by that company will be regulated in slightly different ways across the EU.
All European directives pursue the same overriding objective: achieving harmonisation across EU member states whilst respecting the national legislative power of each jurisdiction. This is normally achieved by establishing a set of principles that each member state incorporates into its own legislation within the parameters of the directive. When a directive, like the 1995 data protection directive, creates a complex regulatory regime involving an independent regulator, member states devise suitable structures that provide for the establishment and operation of that regulator.
This approach to data protection regulation has caused a number of complexities that diminish the two-fold aim of the directive, namely: protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and facilitating the free flow of personal data between member states. The fact that laws and regulators are different make pan-European compliance more difficult and hence less effective. At the same time, the existence of disjointed regulatory approaches creates inefficiencies, business barriers and unnecessary expense for those companies seeking to comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
The lead authority concept
Whilst legislative harmonisation may not be achieved without radical constitutional changes, the experience of simplified oversight in some industry sectors shows that adopting a lead regulator approach is not only possible but desirable. The most promising step in this direction within the data protection regime is the “lead authority” concept that was created for the purpose of assessing and approving Binding Corporate Rules (“BCR”) applications. In 2005, the Article 29 Working Party adopted a co-ordinated approval mechanism that allows companies seeking the approval of their BCR to fast-track their submissions through all of the relevant EU data protection authorities. This mechanism entails choosing an “entry point” data protection authority which will be the official point of contact with the candidate until the BCR are ready for approval in that country, and then will assist the relevant organisation to gain approval throughout the European Union. More recently, a group of data protection authorities within the Article 29 Working Party launched the BCR mutual recognition procedure, so that approval by one authority will automatically lead to approval of the same BCR by the others.
Whilst for some organisations it may be obvious which data protection authority should act as the lead authority, where it is not clear which authority should become the entry point, the co-ordinated approval mechanism establishes that organisations must consider the following factors to determine the most appropriate data protection authority:
· The location of the corporate group’s European headquarters or office with data protection responsibilities.
· The location of the company which is best placed to lead the BCR application and, if necessary, enforce compliance.
· The place where any key operational decisions in terms of the purposes and means of the data processing are made.
· The EU country from which most international transfers originate.
Extending the concept beyond BCR
Both the co-ordinated approval mechanism for BCR and the mutual recognition procedure are contributing to making BCR a much more credible and attractive option for organisations using personal data on a global basis. The fact that the approval stage itself focuses on meeting one single set of standards and expectations – even when these are high – allows those organisations to concentrate their compliance efforts in a consistent and effective way. In other words, companies can devote their attention to ensuring that they apply the right standards and achieve a workable level of privacy and data protection, rather than to dealing with the diverse expectations of a plethora of similar regulators.
Given that BCR systems include policies and procedures affecting the whole range of data protection obligations and rights, it should also be possible to take the lead authority concept beyond BCR and apply it to data protection compliance generally. The criteria to determine the most appropriate data protection authority for BCR applications could also be used to identify the most suitable authority overall. If the single regulator idea has worked in heavily regulated sectors like health care and banking, it is not inconceivable that the same idea could work very effectively in the area of data protection compliance.
If this were the case, global companies collecting, using and sharing data in the EU could not only benefit from the harmonisation of legal standards but from the simplification of regulatory activities across the EU. The national regulators themselves would be able to operate in a much more focussed way. These efficiency gains would ultimately translate into a greater and more realistic level of protection for individuals. So the case for a lead data protection regulator to oversee the data activities of pan-European organisations is one that the EU data protection authorities themselves, as well as the EU Commission, should be making their own.
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Launching another "global" forum to talk about privacy
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Lessons from the failure of global financial regulation
What lessons have we learned from the financial regulatory crisis that are relevant for privacy?
The issues are global. The crisis is global. Financial and data flows are global. Money, in all its diverse forms, flows across borders, making all of finance inter-connected. Global financial flows are now essentially digital data traffic. When it comes to money, and data, countries are not islands, as Iceland has clearly demonstrated. And if there’s anything that flows globally even more quickly than money, it’s data.
You can identify problems before they turn into crises. In retrospect, the problems were pretty obvious, even if people were enjoying the party at the time too much to want to sober up enough to confront them. It’s fashionable to claim that you can only identify a bubble in retrospect. I think that’s nonsense: I knew Florida condos were a bubble when my house painter bought a condo there, on which the annual maintenance fees alone exceeded his annual income, as he proudly told me, but he was unworried, “because real estate prices only go up.” Similarly, in the world of privacy, we already know what the issues are… so, the only real question is whether we need to wait for a crisis to muster the willpower to drive change.
Regulations that are out-of-date are useless. The financial crisis is exposing lots of regulations from other eras that have proven useless. I hardly need to remind readers of the bizarre patchwork of regulations that apply differently, or not at all, to banks, to investment banks, to special financial vehicles, to hedge funds, etc. Similarly, much of the world’s privacy regulations were designed for a pre-Internet world. Having regulations that are out-of-date means that they are either not applied at all, or applied poorly, or simply “re-interpreted” according to the tastes of individual regulators, like the German “regulator” who blithely declared all search engines to be “illegal”, whatever that means. So, having European data protection regulations that require things like “prior authorizations” from “supervisory authorities” before an international transfer of data is quaint (at best), or dangerous (at worst), in the age of the Internet. In fact, I think it’s dangerous to base international data protection rules on obsolete fictions, like the fiction that data flows somehow stop at borders.
Solutions have to be global. Without global solutions, we create the risk of regulatory havens, like tax havens, where actors can engage in regulatory arbitrage, moving from highly-regulated to lightly-or non-regulated spheres, be they countries or industries (e.g., the move from banks to hedge funds). Much of the privacy debate in recent years has been almost exclusively trans-Atlantic. For example, if you read the work of the EU Working Party data protection regulators over the last decade, you would come away with the impression that they are obsessed with privacy issues of US companies and the US government, while almost completely ignoring any privacy issues relating to data flows to or from anywhere else on the planet, such as India, to cite but one example. But surely, even EU data protection authorities in the anti-American ideological camp (perhaps I should use the German word “Anti-Amerikanismus”) will recognize that the US provides much more solid legal protections for personal data than the vast majority of countries on the planet. So, the obsession with the trans-Atlantic data flows issues is actually becoming dangerous, if it blinds us to the global nature of data flows. That’s one reason why I’m so excited about the APEC initiative, a process where many countries with no tradition of privacy laws are coming together to define privacy standards that are up-to-date, multi-national, and forward-looking. APEC is the most positive thing to happen in the world of global privacy standards since the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995.
Enforcement has to be local. While regulations need to be thought of in global terms, enforcement has to be local, to remain anchored in local legal and regulatory traditions. Some have suggested that we should create “super-regulators” with global mandates, like a mini-UN agency. Personally, I think international bodies have a strong role to play in driving forward international standards, but I’ve watched too many international meetings descend into farce to have much hope that they can function as day-to-day regulators. Moreover, different countries cannot have the same regulatory structures, often because of fundamental constitutional reasons. The US simply cannot have an independent Federal Data Protection Authority in the French mode, because the US Constitution wouldn’t allow it. So, calls for global harmonization of regulatory structures are doomed. The French can try to convince French-speaking Ivory Coast of the need to create a French-style data protection authority, and they may succeed, but that’s not a formula for global success. Whether that’s good for the Ivory Coast is another question entirely. The Spanish can try to convince Spanish-speaking Colombia of the need to create a Spanish-style data protection authority, and they may succeed, but they can’t expect a country with a very different constitutional structure, like the US, to follow that lead. There are some people who honestly believe that you can’t have privacy without an EU-style data protection authority…well, hey, they might want to open their eyes wider.
Regulatory experimentation is a good thing. No one really has all the answers. The US experimented with Security Breach Notifications laws, and they generally seem to work, so Europe is adopting them too. Europe experimented with the creation of dedicated privacy Data Protection Authorities, and many countries around the world, from Argentina to New Zealand, have adopted them since. Maintaining some level of regulatory experimentation, even as we move towards global privacy standards, is a healthy foundation for the innovation in privacy frameworks that we need.
There’s no “Mission Accomplished” moment. Moving towards global privacy standards will be a multi-year process, with steps forward, and back, with vigorous debates, with ideology, with pragmatism, with passion. It’s a process, hopefully with progress in a more or less straight line, towards ensuring better privacy protections in our new global reality. Some people will stress the need for a legal framework and legal enforcement powers; others will stress the usefulness of self-regulatory standards. That’s fine, and it reflects traditions: some peoples expect the government to solve most of their problems; others expect the private sector to do most of the work. One thing is certain; we’ll need to carry on this debate virtually, without expensive global summits or conferences, since thanks to the global financial crisis, none of us can afford to travel anymore. Oh well: blogging is great and free.
Friday, September 19, 2008
Why would Germans claim their "privacy" laws prevents them from publishing a list of victims of Nazi terror?
"The federal archive in Berlin has for the first time compiled a list of some 600,000 Jews who lived in Germany up to 1945 and were persecuted by the Nazis.
The names and addresses, which took four years to compile, will be made available to Holocaust groups to help people uncover the fate of relatives.
Archive officials from the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation said the list was not yet definitive and would require further work.
It will not be released to the public because of Germany's privacy laws, but will be passed on to museums and institutions, including Israel's national Holocaust memorial, Yad Vashem.
"In handing over this list, we want to make a substantial contribution to documenting the loss that German Jewry suffered through persecution, expulsion and destruction," said Guenter Saathof, the head of foundation."
I'm a privacy legal expert, and it's baffling to me why German "privacy" laws would prevent this list from being published to the Internet. This is a valuable historical document. Putting it on the Internet would allow people around the world to study it. I would like to see if my grandfather is on the list. I could check if his address in Berlin was indeed correct. I think this information belongs to humanity.
Now, of course, I can imagine certain privacy issues. A very very small number of people included in the list may still be alive. Privacy laws are only meant to protect living human beings, after all, not dead people or their reputations after death. Other laws, like libel laws, can apply after death, but privacy laws cannot. So, I would call on the Foundation to publish its work on the Internet. I think it is wrong to cite "privacy" laws as a reason not to make this information public.
Because, after all, whose "privacy" are we protecting now, for a list which includes names and addresses from something like 70 years ago, and most of whom have been dead for over half a century?
This is the sort of nonsense that gives German privacy law a bad name.
Friday, August 29, 2008
Relax: the Faroe Islands have adequate data protection
Monday, June 16, 2008
Talking to Monsieur Tout-le-Monde
http://www.france-info.com/spip.php?article146650&theme=81&sous_theme=109
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Talking about privacy
http://youtube.com/watch?v=JNu1OtkWrOY
http://youtube.com/watch?v=2IKBke1puFw
http://youtube.com/watch?v=ZkN12ZR9dvE